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MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
By 0. KAHN-FREUND 'I
The Second World War has led to a number of important changes
in the structure of British labour law. None 6f these changes was
revolutionary in character and the legislative policy pursued both by
the Coalition and Labour Governments continued to move along the
traditional lines which have been characteristic of the British approach
to social policy since the opening of this century. Nevertheless, the
exigencies of the war and post-war situations have given rise to some
novel features which are of sufficient interest from the point of view
of the development of patterns of labour legislation to merit the atten-
tion of the American legal public. The object of this paper is to
describe some of these new legislative principles in so far as they
affect the regulation of wages and other conditions of employment,
and to show how they fit into the general structure of British law.1
PREVALENCE OF VOLUNTARY BARGAINING
Reluctance to interfere, abstemiousness and caution have been the
traditional attitudes of British law towards the formulation of mini-
mum standards of wages and conditions of employment. Where the
trade unions are as, strong and as united as they have been in this
country for many decades, they look askance upon the intervention of
the legislature and of the courts. Statutory machinery for the fixing
of minimum wages, legal sanctions for the enforcement of collective
agreements will, in their estimation, at best be a pis aller, a substitute
for "social" sanctions, a crutch to be used until autonomous standards
are able to stand on their own legs, and then to be cast away. There
has been and there is in this country a remarkable measure of
unanimity among employers and unions that wages and conditions of
labour should be collectively regulated praeter legem, and that it is the
function of the law to assist, but not to replace the voluntary bargain-
' Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of
London.
1. The best description and analysis is SELLS, BRITISH WAGES BOARDS, A STUDY
IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1939). This supersedes Miss Sells' earlier work, THE
BRITISH TRADE BOARDS SYSTEM (1923), but has itself been overtaken by events. The
present article attempts to acquaint the reader with developments which have occurred
since the publication of Miss Sells' 1939 work. Chapters V to IX of the INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS HAND100K (Min. Lab. & Nat'l Serv. 1944), contained a good survey of
the legislation, but even this is already out of date. For further information, see
RICHARDSON, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN (1933). The best descriptions
of the wages councils system from a legal point of view are TILLYARD, THE WORKER
AND THE STATE 39-78 (3d ed. 1948) ; W. MANSFIELD COOPER, OUTLINES OF INDUSTRIAL
LAW, c. VIII (1947).
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ing mechanism built up by the two sides of the industry. The law
intervenes supplendi casa-that has been its function in one way or
another since the Trade Boards Act, 1909 __. it has now, under the
Wages Councils Act, 1945,' been called upon to operate adjuvandi
causa, but, whatever economists may say about the need for a "national
wages policy," the British trade unions show little inclination to
tolerate the interference of the law corrigendi causa.'
The collective agreement, concluded between one or several trade
unions on one side, and-as a rule-one or several employers' asso-
ciations on the other, is the primary source of rights and duties as
between employer and employee. It is a source of "rights" and
"duties," however, only if these terms are understood in the wide
sense in which they are used by the sociological school of law. The
lawyer as such will be unable to take cognisance of these agreements,
unless he is willing to adopt some such definition of "law" as that
suggested by Ehrlich.5  The pure positivist for whom nothing is "law"
save that which can ultimately be enforced by state provided sanction,
must ignore the existence of the voluntary bargaining organisations
which dominate British industrial relations and of the collective "con-
tracts" which are the fruit of their labours. But he will ignore these
things at his peril: for so closely are the "legal" principles of British
labour law interwoven with the "praeter legem'" rules and customs,
that not only the function but even the conceptual structure of the
former cannot be understood without constant reference to the latter.
"Voluntary" and "administrative" machinery, "collective" and "stat-
utory" standards form one inextricable pattern.
No one in this country ever speaks of "collective contracts", no
British workman would understand the slogan: "no contract, no
work," for neither layman nor lawyer thinks of the collective agree-
ment as a contract: it gives rise to no right of action in the courts.
Nor are--exceptions apart-the terms of such an agreement "law"
as between individual employers and employees: there is nothing in
the law to prevent them from abrogating the collective terms by their
contract of employment. By the Conciliation Act, 1896,6 the Board
of Trade (now the Ministry of Labour) 7 was empowered to appoint
2. 9 EDw. VII, c. 22 [hereinafter Trade Boards Act, 1909].
3. 8 & 9 GEo. VI, c. 17 [hereinafter Wages Councils Act, 1945].
4. The substance of industrial relations is governed by a mixture of practer legem
custom and delegated legislation. The "law" appears as a "gloss" to customs which
are not legally enforceable. It is the reverse of the interrelation between fis civile
and jus honorarium in Rome or between common law and equity in England. See
MAITLAND, EQurrY, c. II (1929).
5. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1936).
6. 59 & 60 Visc., c. 30.
7. New Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916, 6 & 7 GEo. V, c. 68.
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conciliators and arbitrators. By the industrial Courts Act, 1919,8 a
standing Industrial Court was created "for the purpose of the settle-
ment of trade disputes." ' But neither the awards of conciliators
under the Act of 1896, nor those of the Industrial Court under the
1919 Act, have any "binding" force. From a legal point of view
they are mere suggestions, and no court can prevent anyone from
disregarding them, yet out of 1755 awards rendered by the Industrial
Court during the first twenty years of its existence, only four
were disobeyed by the parties."0 The policy of keeping the main
body of industrial relations out of the courts-the Industrial Court
is not a "court" in the ordinary sense-was justified by the events.
But the events also demonstrated the need for "legal" intervention
in strictly defined and exceptional cases. This intervention proceeded
along two different lines.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE LAW
The law was faced with two types of situations, easily distin-
guishable in theory, much less so in practice: collective regulation
might fail at its inception owing to the unwillingness or inability of
the employers to negotiate at all, or it might fail in its operation owing
to the weakness of the bargaining organisations on either side or on
both sides: federated employers or organised employees might be
disloyal to the terms of the agreement or,-more important--out-
siders might be too numerous and too strong to be compelled or in-
duced to abide by the terms of the bargain.
It was impossible for the British legislator to respond to the
challenge of the first type of situation by adopting the device used by
the American National Labor Relations Act." For it was, in the
most important cases, not a refusal of individual employers to negotiate
with a strong and representative union which called for legislative
intervention. It was the absence of effective organisations on the
workers' side, the inability of union organisers to form a bargaining
body, which in these industries prevented the normal collective ma-
chinery from coming into existence. Hence legal compulsion to
negotiate would have been in vain: for often there was no one the
employers could have negotiated with, while in other cases the indus-
8. 9 & 10 GRo. V, c. 69.
9. Id. § 1.
10. See SHARP, A STUDY OF THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION AS A VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE IN SOME BRITISH INDUSTRIES, WITH AN
ACCOUNT OF STATE ACTION IN THIS FIELD (unpublished Ph. D. thesis in the Univer-
sity of London, 1940).
11. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1947).
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try was so "scattered," the number of employers so large, their con-
duct so difficult to check, that a compulsion to bargain, while theo-
retically possible, would have been difficult to enforce in practice.'
2
It was this type of situation which was met by the long series of
minimum wage laws, beginning with the Trade Boards Act, 1909, and
culminating in the Wages Councils Act, 1945.
The second type of case called for a different remedy: it was not
until very recently that the statutory wage fixing machinery was put
to the services of strengthening existing collective agreements. The
method--or methods-used during the interwar period and also dur-
ing the second world war, to secure the enforcement of collective
agreements by "legal" means were-largely---experimental. They do
not form the subject-matter of this paper.13  In an indirect way much
the most significant of these methods was and is the Fair Wages
clause, or, to be more precise, a whole structure of such clauses, em-
bodied in the Fair Wages Resolutions of the House of Commons of
1891, 1909, and 1946,"4 in standing orders of numerous local authori-
ties, and in a series of statutes dealing with government subsidies,
grants and licences."5 These clauses, which have been discussed by
the present writer elsewhere,'" are one of the cornerstones of British
labour legislation. By comparing the wording of the House of Com-
mons Resolutions of 1891, 1909, and 1946, one can trace an evolution
similar to that which is reflected in the development from the Trade
Boards Act, 1909, to the Trade Boards Act, 1918, and to the Wages
Councils Act, 1945, i. e., from the mere prevention of "sweating" to
the recognition of "commonly recognised standards" and from there
to the protection of collective agreements.
The direct method of enforcing collective agreements played and
continues to play a subordinate role in British law, but there stands
out as a most interesting piece of legislation the Cotton Manufacturing
12. Public corporations established under nationalisation laws are placed under
a duty to negotiate. See, e. g., Electricity Act, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 54, § 53; Trans-
port Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Gao. VI, c. 49, § 95; Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946,
9 & 10 Gao. VI, c. 59, § 46. See Robson, Nationalised Industries and Industrial Law,
2 INDUSTRIAL LAW RFv. 192 (1948). This huty would, in an appropriate case, appear
to be enforceable by an order of mandamus.
13. See Tillyard and Robson, The Enforcement of the Collective Bargain in the
United Kingdom, 48 EcoN. J. 15 (1938) ; Kahn-Freund, Collective Agreements under
War Legislation, 6 MoD. L. REv. 112 (1943).
14. For the wording of the Resolutions, see INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS HANDBOOK
133-138 (1944). For the 1946 Resolution (drafted in 1942), see CMD. No. 6399
(1946). See also SELLS, BRITISH WAGES BOARDS, A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL DEoc-
RAcy 46 (1939).
15. For an enumeration of such statutes, see INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS HANDBOOK
136 (1944). Add to this: Civil Aviation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. VI, c. 70, § 41.
16. Kahn-Freund, Legislation Through Adjudication. The Legal Aspect of Fair
Wages Clauses and Recognised Conditions, 11 MOD. L. REv. 269, 429 (1948)
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Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1934,"7 which-despite its
name-is still in force." This Act was passed in order to deal with
the difficulties facing trade unions and employers' organisations in
the cotton weaving industry of Lancashire and the surrounding coun-
ties. During the depression of the 'thirties the undercutting of union
rates by outsiders and the consequential underbidding of prices by
non-federated employers became intolerable for both sides of the in-
dustry, and on neither side were the organisations sufficiently strong
to overcome with the help of the normal voluntary machinery the dan-
ger threatening their existence. The workers were badly organised,
the number of employers was large and individual undertakings often
small and scattered. In this extreme situation organised workers and
federated employers, acting together, called for the assistance of the
law. The Act illustrates the cautious approach of the British legis-
lator towards the problems of collective bargaining. Its operation is
confined to the cotton manufacturing industry in a number of areas
named in the Schedule. The minister may-in his discretion-by
order "bring into force"'" the wage rates contained in a collective
agreement, and, if he does, they will be "in force" as respects all per-
sons employed in the industry of the class and description to which
the agreement relates. The collective wage rate becomes--compul-
sorily-a minimum term of the individual contracts of employment,
and the payment of a lower wage becomes a criminal offence. The
civil sanction is directed to the contract, the penal sanction is directed
to the act of performance: underpayment is a criminal offence, no mat-
ter whether or not the parties to the contract purported to contract
out the collective agreement or whether or not the employee purported
to waive his claim. The employer must give publicity to the order in
the workshop.2" While the threefold mechanism of sanctions-civil,
penal, administrative--corresponds to the familiar scheme of British
minimum wage legislation, it is in the pre-conditions of the ministerial
order and in the conditions of its continued existence that we must
find the original contribution of this statute to the system of industrial
legislation. This Act is not designed to strengthen the hands of
organised labour against organised capital or vice versa. Its tendency
is to give to the organisations on both sides weapons against their
disloyal members, and, above all, against outsiders. Hence the pro-
vision that the minister cannot act except upon a joint application by
an employers' and a workers' organisation, both of which must be
17. 24 & 25 GEo. V, c. 30 [hereinafter Cotton (Temporary) Act, 1934].
18. See SELLS, op. cit. spra note 14, at 36, 66-69.
19. Cotton (Temporary) Act, 1934, § 2.
20. Id. § 3.
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"representative", in the employers' case, of firms controlling the
majority of the looms-and, in the workers' case, the majority of the
persons employed.2 Moreover, as soon as either of the organisations
"jumps off" and requests the minister to revoke the order (wholly
or in part), the minister must do so.22 In no circumstances can the
minister enforce a wage policy of his own: he cannot vary the contents
of the agreement, either he makes the order or refuses to do so, tertium
nzon datur, but he may-in certain circumstances-revoke an order of
his own motion.23
This statute is highly significant: the only major enactment to
make collective agreements directly enforceable leaves the relationship
between organised capital and labour untouched; it affects, so to speak,
the domestic aspect of industrial relations on either side. It is also
significant in another respect (and much of what will have to be said
below about minimum wage legislation will be an elaboration of this
theme) : it illustrates the extreme distrust with which the British
public views the unaided efforts of civil servants in the field of in-
dustrial relations. The minister must not make an order under the
Act, unless a board of three independent persons-none of them con-
nected with the industry-has found that the two applying organisa-
tions are "representative," and unanimously reported to the minister
that the making of the order is "expedient." 24 Six representatives
of each of the applying organisations sit with the board "as assessors",
but without a vote, and the board must consider written objections
and may hear oral evidence." As has been said, the minister-al-
though on an application in the prescribed form he must appoint a
board 26-- has an ultimate discretion whether or not he will follow a
positive recommendation of the board. He has none where the board
recommends not to make the order. The quasi-judicial machinery of
an independent board, circumscribing the outer range of the govern-
ment department's freedom of action will be met with again in the
course of this article. It is a typical form of British legislation, de-
signed to utilise the experience of voluntary bargaining for statutory
purposes.
27
21. Id. §§ 1(1), 7(2). The employers' organisations must represent the majority
of looms, but need not represent the majority of firms. The big employer (often the
"good" employer) may require protection against large numbers of small outsiders
who tend to undercut wages.
22. Id. § 4(1).
23. Id. §§4(2), (3).
24. Id. §§ 1(3), (4), 5(1).
25. Id. §§5(3), (4).
26. Id. §1(1).
27. The independent board, under the Cotton (Temporary) Act, 1934, became the
prototype for the commissions of inquiry under the Wages Councils Act, 1945. This is
a typical example of a statutory "pixlot" experiment.
784 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
PATTERNS OF MINIMUM WAGE LAWS
Legislation such as that discussed above presupposes the existence
of bargaining machinery capable of producing workable collective
agreements. There are, under that type of enactment, no statutory
bodies charged with the formulation of conditions. All that the ad-
ministration has to do is to add the sanction of the law to agreements
voluntarily concluded. Much more important are those enactments
which create machinery designed to establish standards and to formu-
late conditions.28 We enter here the field of minimum wage legis-
291lation proper.
All these statutes-however much they may vary in detail-are
species of a genus. The basic scheme is the same throughout. It
is not the "minister," i. e. not the Civil Service, who regulates wages,
holidays, etc. This task is entrusted to councils or boards30 whose
members are, except in one case, appointed by the minister (i. e. the
Minister of Labour, and, in the case of agriculture, the Minister of
Agriculture or the Secretary of State for Scotland), but who operate
independently." These boards or councils, known as "wage regu-
lating authorities," 3 are composed of two elements: a number of
independent or impartial members, neither active civil servants nor
persons connected with the particular industry, and a number of repre-
28. The relevant statutes are: Trade Boards Act, 1909; Trade Boards Act, 1918,
8 & 9 GEo. V, c. 32 [hereinafter Trade Boards Act, 1918] (now repealed) ; Agricul-
tural Wages (Regulation) Act, 1924, 14 & 15 GEo. V, c. 37; Agricultural Wages
(Regulation) Act, 1940, 3 & 4 GEo. VI, c. 17; Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act,
1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 15 (now repealed); Agricultural Wages (Regulation)
(Scotland) Act, 1937, 1 EDw. VIII, and 1 GEO. VI, c. 53; Agricultural Wages (Regu-
lation) (Scotland) Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEO. VI, c. 47 (now repealed) ; Road Haulage
Wages Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEo. VI, c. 6 [hereinafter Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938]
(now repealed as far as relevant) ; Holidays With Pay Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEo. VI, c.
70 (now repealed as far as relevant) ; Catering Wages Act, 1943, 6 & 7 GEo. VI, c.
24 [hereinafter Catering Wages Act, 1943] ; Wages Councils Act, 1945; Wages Coun-
cils Act, 1948, 12 & 13 Gao. VI, c. 7 [hereinafter Wages Councils Act, 1948]; Agri-
cultural Wages Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. VI, c. 47 [hereinafter Agricultural Wages
Act, 1948] ; Agricultural Wages (Scotland) Act, 1949.
29. The Coal Mines (Minimum Wages) Act, 1912, 2 GEo. V, c. 2, has been left
out of account. It is still on the statute books, but has long ceased to be of practical
importance. See RIcIHARDSON, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN 150 (1933) ;
TILLYARD, INDUSTRIAL LAW 67 (2d ed. 1928) ; SELLS, op. cit. spra note 14, at 22-24,
59-61. For the comparatively numerous decisions under the Act (all rendered between
1913 and 1916), see SLESSER AND HENDERSON, INDUSTRIAL LAW 674-676 (1924). By
§ 89 of the Education Act, 1944, 7 & 8 GEo. VI, c. 31, the "Burnham Committees" con-
sisting of local authorities' and teachers' representatives are given statutory status.
The minister can, by order, make the scales of remuneration submitted by the Com-
mittees binding and enforceable.
30. Wages Councils under the Wages Councils Acts, 1945, and 1948; Catering
Wages Boards under the Catering Wages Act, 1943; the Agricultural Wages Board,
the Scottish Agricultural Wages Board, and Agricultural Wages Committees under
the Agricultural Wages Act, 1948; and under the Agricultural Wages (Scotland)
Act, 1949,
31. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 1(1) ; Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 1(1) ; Agri-
cultural Wages Act, 1948, Schedules I & II.
32. This nomenclature was introduced by the Holidays with Pay Act, 1938, 1 & 2
Guo. VI, c. 70.
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sentative members appointed by the minister after consultation with
the employers' or workers' organisations concerned, or, in the case
of agriculture, directly nominated or elected by the latter.3 3 The repre-
sentatives on either side must be equal in number, and they must
always together constitute the majority of the board. The minister
may not appoint more than a stated maximum of independent mem-
bers, but otherwise the size of the board is, except in the case of the
Agricultural Wages Board, within his discretion. 4  He must appoint
one of the independent members as permanent chairman, another may
be appointed deputy chairman. 5 Only independent members receive
remuneration for their services, but all members obtain travelling and
other allowances or a refund of expenses.86 The duration of their
tenure is determined by the minister before he makes the appointment.87
This basic pattern of organisation reproduces on a statutory basis
the long-established system of voluntary bargaining machinery. Even
where the representative members are appointed as individuals, they
are in effect usually the mouthpieces of their organisations. They
enter into a legally regulated disputation assisted by the good offices
of the former civil servants, economists, lawyers, etc., who as in-
dependent members constitute a neutral power. If they achieve a
compromise, what emerges is in substance a collective agreement be-
tween the two sides, though in law it is a statutory order, a piece of
delegated legislation, the contractual basis of which remains legally
irrelevant.
The statutes which, from time to time, have set up these wage
regulating authorities, have conformed to one of two patterns. Either
they dealt with a particular industry and established wage fixing ma-
chinery adapted to its special needs, or they created a general frame-
work available for any number of trades and industries and formulated
the conditions under which the executive, i. e., the minister, is em-
powered to constitute councils or boards. Where Parliament used
the first-the more rigid-type of organisation, the wage regulating
33. Wages Councils Act, 1945, Schedule I; Catering Wages Act, 1943, Schedule
II; Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, Schedules I & III.
34. For the wages councils and catering wages boards the minister may appoint
up to three independent members, and for the Agricultural Wages Board the Minister
of Agriculture may appoint up to five "appointed" members. The agricultural wages
committees have two "impartial" members and may, in addition, have an impartial
chairman.
35. The Agricultural Wages Board has no permanent deputy chairman. The
chairmen of the agricultural wages committees are in a special position. Their func-
tions are not merely procedural, but more like those of industrial arbitrators. They
have a second or casting vote, exercisable in case of an equality of votes. Before they
vote, they may, if so authorized by a resolution of the representative members, adjourn
the meeting and obtain the advice of the Agricultural Wages Board.
36. See SELLS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 84. The arrangement is slightly different
under § 11 of the Agricultural Wages Act, 1948.
37. In the case of agriculture this must be done by "Regulations."
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authority derived its existence from the statute itself. In these cases
Parliament itself has answered the question whether for the industry
concerned statutory intervention is required. Neither the minister
nor the wage fixing organ is called upon to consider this question.
The major problem of policy "in what circumstances should the law
intervene" remains, as it were, inarticulate. It appears in the Par-
liamentary debates which precede the making of the statute; it does not
appear in the statute itself. The need for a statutory minimum is
the raison d'&tre for the existence of the statute, and therefore not
required as an express justification for its application in specie. The
only remaining statute of this kind is the Agricultural Wages Act, by
the terms of which the Agricultural Wages Board must fix minimum
time wages for agricultural workers.8 s The law has developed away
from this rigid type of organisation and, apart from the case of
agriculture, all minimum wage fixing authorities set up by statute
have given way to bodies set up by the minister in his discretion under
statutory authority. 9  This second-the more flexible type-of organ-
isation is exemplified by such modern statutes as the Wages Councils
Act and the Catering Wages Act.40 Under these statutes the minister
is merely enabled to set up wage regulating authorities. Parliament
formulates the conditions under which it intends the statutory ma-
chinery to operate. The considerations of social policy are here
raised from the level of a legislative motive to that of a statutory en-
actment. They are recast in the shape of a legal principle circum-
scribing the minister's scope of action, and they acquire the fixity of an
articulate norm. It is therefore this trade board (wages council)
legislation which lays open to the analysis of the lawyer the trends of
social policy in Britain as they developed in the course of the last
forty years. It is this legislation which demonstrates that "trial and
error" method, that progress from the particular to the general which
is a proverbial characteristic of British statute making. It is this
legislation too, which provides the sociologist with a standard example
of how changes in the structure of society and of public opinion can
transform the functions of an institution without affecting its essen-
tial legal framework.
38. Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 3(2).
39. Under the Wages Councils Act, 1948, § 1, the Road Haulage Central Wages
Board, set up by the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938, has been replaced by a wages
council.
40. Catering Wages Act, 1943. The Act does not apply to a particular industry,
but to "all persons employed in any undertaking, or any part of an undertaking,
which consists wholly or mainly in the carrying on" of catering activities, i. e. not
only to hotels, restaurants, etc., but also to factory canteens, school canteens, etc.,
§ 1(2). Whether and how far "catering' in any sense was a "trade" within the mean-
ing of the Trade Boards Acts was, to say the least, extremely doubtful. See R, v.
Minister of Labour, Ex parte National Trade Defence Association and Others, [1932]
1 K. B. 1.
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MINIMUM WAGE LAWS AND VOLUNTARY NEGOTIATION
Winston Churchill's Trade Boards Act of 1909 was designed to
counteract "sweating." It applied directly to four industries then
notorious for their low level of wages.41 For these four industries
the government department concerned (then the Board of Trade, since
1917 the Ministry of Labour) was authorised by the Act itself to set
up wage fixing bodies known as "trade boards." For other trades
such boards could be established by "Provisional Order," ' if the rate
of wages prevailing in any part of the trade was "exceptionally low
as compared with that in other employments." " No reference to col-
lective agreements or voluntary negotiation machinery can be found
in this statute. The wage fixing machinery was not as yet under-
stood as an instrument to be used in order to supplement, let alone
to support, collective bargaining. The statutory minimum wage was
still regarded as an anomalous measure, an ultima ratio, to be applied
only in the face of extreme abuses. Until the outbreak of the First
World War only four trade boards were added to those originally
established by the Act.
The Trade Boards Act, 1918,44 passed as a result of the Whitley
Reports, 45 revealed a new spirit. The mechanism, first set in motion
by the Act of 1909, was used for new objectives. The statute em-
powered the minister by "special order" 46 a greatly simplified pro-
cedure-to establish trade boards for any "specified trade," "if he was
of opinion that no adequate machinery existed for the effective regu-
lation of wages throughout the trade, and that accordingly, having
regard to the rates of wages prevailing in the trade, or any part of
the trade, it was expedient" to apply the Act.4" The old reference
to "exceptionally low" wages was repealed. Under the guise of pass-
ing an amending statute, Parliament had put an old institution to the
services of a new social purpose: no longer were the trade boards
solely designed to operate in cases of glaring exploitation, but hence-
forward they would be a normal method of supplementing voluntary
41. Trade Boards Act, 1909, § 1(1), and Schedule. See SELLS, op. Cit. supra note
14, at 17.
42. A Provisional Order requires for its effectiveness a positive resolution of both
Houses of Parliament.
43. Trade Boards Act, 1909, § 1(2).
44. See note 2 smpra.
45. During the First World War, the Reconstruction Committee on Relations
between Employers and Employed under the chairmanship of J. H. Whitley, after-
wards Speaker of the House of Commons, made five reports which formed the basis
of much of the labour legislation passed after the War.
46. Trade Boards Act, 1918, §§ 1, 2, and Schedule I. A special order took effect
on being made, but had to be laid before each House of Parliament. It was subject
to being annulled upon address of either House presented within forty days.
47. Id. § 1 (2).
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collective bargaining. Yet among the many shortcomings and almost
inhlescribable casuistic difficulties inherent in this statute, one leaps
to the eye: the criterion of intervention was the presence or absence
of adequate bargaining machinery, not the presence or absence of effec-
tive collective regulation. In other words: where, in a given industry,
trade unions and employers' associations had set up a joint industrial
council, a conciliation board, or a similar (permanent or ad hoc) body,
and this body was "adequate" to produce an "effective regulation of
wages," no trade board could be established. It could not be estab-
lished even if the "regulation of wages" ceased to be "effective", either
because of a falling off in union membership or of memberships of
the employers' organisation, or because of a growing unwillingness of
the organised employers themselves to abide by the terms of the agree-
ment concluded by their organisation.
Nevertheless, the scope given to the statutory wage fixing ma-
chinery by the Act of 1918 was wider than that required by the I. L. 0.
Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention of 1928 which was
ratified by Great Britain and came into force in 1930.48 This Con-
vention stands somewhere between the two British Acts of 1909 and
1918. By its terms each member state of the I. L. 0. undertakes to
create or maintain such machinery "for workers employed in certain
of the trades or parts of trades . . . in which no arrangements
exist for the effective regulation of wages by collective agreement or
otherwise and wages are exceptionally low". The international con-
vention thus combines two principles, viz. that of the subsidiary or
supplementary character of statutory wage regulation and that of its
"exceptional" ("anti-sweating") function. There is no trace in it of
the new ideas embodied in British legislation since the Second World
War.
In 1943 Parliament passed the Catering Wages Act, a statute
which, despite its limited scope of application, is of great importance
for the new legislative principles expressed in its terms.49 The Trade
Boards Acts could not, for technical reasons inherent in the definition
of a "trade," be universally applied to the catering industry, and special
machinery was required in order to deal with the conditions of service
of persons employed in it. Wages boards can be established for any
category of catering workers in the absence of "machinery set up by
agreement between organisations representing employers and workers
48. INT'L. LAB. CODE, Art. 86 (1939).
49. The Act applies irrespective of whether the undertaking is carried on for
profit. Catering is defined as "the supply of food or drink for immediate consumption,
the provision 9 f living accommodation for guests or lodgers or for persons employed
in the undertaking," including incidental and ancillary activities. Catering Wages
Act, 1943, § 1 (2).
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respectively . . . for regulating those workers' remuneration and
conditions of employment." Such wage boards can also be established
if negotiation machinery exists, but "is not, and cannot by any im-
provements which it is practicable to secure, be made adequate for the
regulation" of remuneration and conditions.5" So far the Act merely
continues the policy of the Trade Boards Act, 1918,-apart from the
reference to "conditions of employment" other than remuneration
which, as will appear below, is less significant than would seem at first
sight. The decisive innovation is to be found in the definition of
"adequacy" of bargaining machinery for regulating remuneration and
conditions. This is to depend not only on "what matters are capable
of being dealt with by that machinery, but also to what extent those
matters are covered by the agreements or awards arrived at or given
thereunder and to what extent the practice is in accordance with those
agreements or awards." "
Here, in the writer's opinion, is a deliberate and decisive new
departure in legislative policy, foreshadowing the more far-reaching
reforms introduced two years later. Minimum wages (and holidays)
can be laid down despite and even because of the existence of a collec-
tive agreement or award, if the practice is not in conformity with its
terms. In effect, the statutory minimum wage fixing machinery can
be used in order to fill the gap left by the absence of "legally" enforce-
able collective agreements and awards. Their contents can (in so far
as wages and holidays are concerned) be re-cast in the shape of a stat-
utory wages regulation order and thus be given the force of contractual
terms as between employer and employee. The whole machinery of
civil, criminal, and administrative sanctions, can be set in motion, in
effect, for the enforcement of the substance of collective regulations.
Those regulations as such remain praeter legem, but, where this is
required, they can be remoulded into an administrative order, just as
the substance of an international treaty (which, as such, is not the law
of the land) can be converted into "law" by an Act of Parliament.
If the Trade Boards Act, 1918, was the outcome of the First
World War, the Second War led to the passing of the Wages Councils
Act, 1945, which repealed the Trade Boards Acts of 1909 and 1918."2
The "traide boards" have been re-christened as "wages councils," a
change of name which is of more than symbolic significance. A
"wages council" can be established under two alternative conditions.
The minister may, in the first place, make an order setting up a wages
council "if he is of opinion that no adequate machinery exists for the
50. Id. §4(1).
51. Id. § 3 (2) (emphasis added).
52. See a note by the present writer in 8 MOD. L. ZEv. 68 (1943).
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effective regulation of the workers described in the Order and that,
having regard to the remuneration existing among those workers, it
is expedient that such a council should be established." " This is, of
course, the basic principle of the 1918 Act, but in a new formulation.
No longer is it the criterion whether machinery exists in a "trade"
for the "effective regulation of wages," but the question to be asked
and answered refers to a category of workers to be defined in the
minister's order itself. No longer is it a "rate of wages" which has
to be considered, but "remuneration," i. e., what is actually paid, and
under what conditions payment is being earned. The whole mecha-
nism has been made far more flexible by eliminating the rigid and
cumbrous conception of a "trade," and more comprehensive by switch-
ing it over from a regulation of wage rates to a regulation of "re-
muneration." In the present context, however, the main interest con-
centrates on the second alternative set of circumstances under which
the minister may act. A wages council can also be established for a
category of workers on the ground that "the existing machinery for
the settlement of remuneration and conditions of employment for those
workers is likely to cease to exist or to be adequate for that purpose" 54
and, whether or not such machinery is, or is likely to remain, "ade-
quate" depends, inter alia, on the tests formulated in the Act of 1943
and verbally repeated in that of 1945,"' amongst which there appears
the question "to what extent the practice is . . . in accordance with
. agreements and awards." But a few words were added to the
text of 1945, words which express the intention to use the statutory
machinery not only as a remedy, but also as a preventive. While
under the Catering Act the enforcement of collective regulations in the
past has to be solely considered in order to determine whether the
bargaining machinery had remained adequate, the Act of 1945 makes
it incumbent on the authorities, also to decide whether the practice
"is likely to be" in accordance with collective regulations. These
agreements and awards, therefore, can be "embodied" in a wage regu-
lation order, even if they have been universally observed so far, where
the trend of the economic and social development in the industry is
such that a lowering of the standard of actual observance of the collec-
tive terms can be anticipated in future.
Where the Wages Councils Act is thus to be used-as Mr. Bevin
expressed it in the House of Commons as a "prop" for tottering
bargaining machinery, i. e., where the minister acts on the second of
53. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 1(2) (a).
54. Id. §§ 1(2) (b), 2(1), 3.
55. Id. § 4(6).
56. See 407 H. C. DFB. 78 et seq. (5th ser. 1944-1945).
MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
the above mentioned two alternatives, the procedure leading up to the
creation of a wages council differs from the normal one. The Act, as
happens unfortunately so frequently with British statutes, obscures the
substantive legal principles by concealing them in a bewildering mass
of procedural detail. 7  The more important principles involved in
these purely technical provisions will be discussed below.
A few figures and facts may perhaps illustrate the actual sig-
nificance of this legislation in the life of the British nation. Thirty-
seven new Boards were created in 1919, 1920, and 1921 under the
1918 Act. "The number of Boards in June, 1944, was 52, of which
40 cover Great Britain, 6 operate only in England and Wales, and 6
only in Scotland." "' Fifty-one of these trade boards are now in opera-
tion as wages councils. Among the more important trades included
in the list of trade boards the following may be mentioned: baking,
cutlery, dressmaking, furniture manufacture (recently removed from
the list), hollow-ware, laundry, milk distribution, rubber manufacture,
shirt-making, sugar confectionery and food preserving, tobacco, and
toy manufacture. The number of workers protected by this legislation
was estimated at 1,200,000 in September 1939, the number of estab-
lishments on the list at the end of 1936 was 89,148. In 1936 "approx-
imately 70 per cent of the workpeople concerned were females." 59
Engineering and shipbuilding, cotton spinning and the woolen and
worsted industries of Yorkshire, the railways and shipping, and the
building industry have never been subject to minimum wage legisla-
tion, and the same is true-with one ephemeral exception which has
lost its practical significance--of coal mining. The industries com-
prised in the list of special statutes or of trade board orders are mainly
such as are characterised by the multitude and smallness of under-
takings, in many instances the prevalence of homework or of female
labour, and, in general, an intensive "union resistance" on the part
of the workers.6"
57. For a criticism of the draftsmanship of the Act see Robson, Legisaltive Drafts-
manship, 17 POL. Q. 330, 336 et seq. (1946).
58. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONs HANDBOOK 142 et seq., App. VI (1944).
59. Ibid.; see also RicHARDSoN, note 1 supra; SELLS, op. cit. supra note 14, passin
and esp. at 48, 115, 219.
60. The picture would be very different if account was taken of those provisions
which control not the level of the wages but the mode of payment and the calculation
of piece rates, i. e. statutes such as the Truck Acts, 1831 to 1940; the "particulars"
clause in § 112 of the Factories Act, 1937, 1 EDW. VIII & GEo. VI, c. 67; and the en-
actments dealing with "checkweighing," e. g., the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887,
50 & 51 Vicr., c. 58, and the Checkweighing in Various Industries Act, 1919, 9 & 10
GEO. V, c. 51. Legislative intervention is more necessary to safeguard the mode of
performance than to regulate the substance of the obligation of contracts of employ-
ment. The latter is more amenable to trade union control from outside.
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CENTRALISATION AND DE-CENTRALISATION
If the members of the wage regulating authorities are selected
in the manner outlined above, there is no legislative guarantee that
they are representative in a geographical as well as in a vocational
sense. Experience shows, and good policy demands, that there should
be, in matters which touch the livelihood of men and women, local as
well as occupational self-government. How to prevent the controls
from being too remote is a major question even in a comparatively
small country like Britain. It is a difficult problem in view of the
tendency towards centralisation inherent in the economic development.
Where the more flexible type of wage regulating machinery
operates, this problem is of an administrative rather than of a legisla-
tive character. Under the Wages Councils Act, 1945, and under the
Catering Wages Act, 1943, the minister is at liberty to limit the
jurisdiction of the wages councils and boards with the help of geo-
graphical as well as other criteria, i. e., he may establish separate wage
regulating authorities for different areas. It does not, however, ap-
pear that much use has been made of this power of decentralisation.
Under the old Trade Boards Acts the boards themselves were em-
powered to establish "district trade committees" with limited func-
tions,"' but this facility was very sparingly used, and the Wages Coun-
cils Act does not contain any analogous provision. It will be seen
that the tendency towards centralised wage regulation which dominates
voluntary collective bargaining is reflected in the statutory wage regu-
lation organisation. It is the inevitable result of developments both
in the business and in the trade union world. Nevertheless it remains
true that, from a psychological point of view, local representation in
the centralised bodies is desirable, but Parliament has not provided for
any safeguards in this respect, and it is left to the organisations on
both sides and to the minister to ensure that the representative mem-
bers of the councils and boards are selected in a manner designed to
give self-expression to local interests."2
There existed, however, until recently one case in which the law
itself had made an attempt to secure local representation in a central
wage fixing authority. This was the Road Haulage Central Wages
61. Trade Boards Act, 1909, § 12. See SELLS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 163, 166-
172. The minister may have had the power to set up trade boards on a local basis
(see AmulREE, INDUsTRIAL AIniTAIoN IN GRaAT BRITAIN 157 (1929), but, apart
from creating a number of boards for England and for Scotland, he did not exercise it.
62. Wages Councils may also, for certain purposes, establish committees and sub-
committees (Wages Councils Act, 1945, Schedule I, No. 6), and catering wage boards
may request the Minister to appoint committees (Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 6, and
Schedule II, No. 8).
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Board, set up under the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938,3 which has
now, under the Wages Councils Act, 1948,64 been abolished and re-
placed by a wages council. The Central Wages Board was, (and the
wages council which has taken its place is), the wage regulating
authority for all drivers of road goods vehicles and kindred workers
in Great Britain, employed by operators using the vehicle for hire
or reward.6 5 This is, from a British point of view, a high degree of
centralisation, justified by the licensing system established for road
goods vehicles by the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933,66 and by the
structure of the trade unions in the Transport industry. To obviate
over-centralisation area wages boards were set up under the 1938 Act
with mainly consultative functions, and entirely composed of repre-
sentative, i. e., without "independent," members.67 These area boards
served as a recruiting basis for the majority of those representing the
two sides of the industry in the Central Board, i. e., in the actual
process of wage fixing. The bulk of the representative members of
the Central Board were chosen by the Minister from the area boards
and after consultation with them, one employer and one worker from
each of the ten English area boards and one each from the Scottish
area board. There were, in addition, representative members ap-
pointed at the centre, but they formed the minority. With the repeal
of the relevant provisions of the Road Haulage Central Wages Act,
1938, and the abolition of the Central Board as well as the area boards,
this unique combination of vocational and geographical representation
has disappeared, liut it remains of interest as an institutional pattern. '6 "
One might have expected to find a similar arrangement in the
one remaining case of wage fixing machinery directly set up by stat-
ute, i. e., in the case of agriculture. In this industry local variations
and interests would appear to be especially prominent and the need
for geographical representation most urgent. Yet it is in this case
that one can observe the tendency towards centralisation most clearly.
The jurisdiction of the Agricultural Wages Board extends over the
whole of England and Wales, and there is a separate Board for Scot-
63. 1 & 2 GEo. VI, c. 6.
64. 12 & 13 GEo. VI, c. 7.
65. For details see the Third Schedule to the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938.
66. 23 & 24 GEO. V, c. 53. Under this act no one may use a goods vehicle on a
road for the carriage of goods for hire or reward without an A- or B-license, and
no one may use such a vehicle in his own business (other than that of carrier) with-
out a C-license. The text refers only to A- and B-licensed vehicles.
67. See the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938, §§ 1, 2, and Schedules I, II. All
these provisions have been repealed by the Wages Councils Act, 1948.
68. See the (repealed) First Schedule to the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938.
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land. 9 In addition agricultural wages committees have been estab-
lished, as a rule one for each county. Under the original scheme laid
down in the 1924 Act it was the task of the committees and not that
of the Board to fix minimum wage rates for agricultural workers."°
The Board acted as a supervisory body: it made the orders under
which the decisions of the committees became effective,'71 it assumed
the functions of a committee which failed to fulfil them in proper time
and manner," and it acted as a kind of appeal tribunal if requested to
do so by the representative members of a committee. 3 In 1940, as a
result of war conditions, a national minimum wage for agricultural
workers was introduced-a significant achievement in social reform.
Under the now repealed Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Amend-
ment Act, 1940, 7' the Board fixed this minimum wage as a binding
directive for the committees. The committees remained the principal
wage fixing authorities-in law. 75  In substance the task of formu-
lating the principles of agricultural wages policy and of translating
them into action had been shifted to the centre, but the pattern of
organisation and the composition of the various bodies remained un-
changed. Now, under the Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, by which
the earlier statutes have been repealed, the duty to fix minimum time
rates and the power of fixing piece rates, holidays and holiday wage
rates, and of cancelling or varying them, has been transferred to the
Board. The Board makes these decisions for each county or com-
bination of counties for which an agricultural wages committee is
established, i. e., in theory the Board may make different decisions for
each county.70 Yet this decision is made at the centre and the local
committees have merely the right to make representations. 77  On the
other hand, a number of secondary functions are entrusted to the com-
mittees. These are mainly connected with the adaptation of the cen-
tral decisions to individual and local conditions, such as the permis-
sion to employ incapacitated workers at a rate lower than that fixed
by the Board, the variation of the rents for "tied cottages" fixed by
the Board, the fixing of additional piece rates for individual workers,
and the general supervision of the training of "learners." 78 All these
69. Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 1; Agricultural Wages (Scotland) Act,
1949. See, on the problem of centralisation and decentralisation in agriculture, SELLs,
op. cil. supra note 14, at 140-145.
70. 14 & 15 GEo. V, c. 37, § 2.
71. Id. §3.
72. Id. §§ 5 (a), (b).
73. Id. §5(c).
74. 3 & 4 GEO. VI, c. 17.
75. Id. §2.
76. Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 1 (1). See also Fourth Schedule, No. 5.
77. Id. § 1(2).
78. Id. §§ 5, 7(3), 8, 6.
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functions must, however, be exercised in accordance with the general
directions given by the Board." This process of centralisation of
functions, inevitable and by no means unwelcome in itself, has not,
however, produced any transformation in the structure of the Board.
The representative members of the Board continue to be centrally
nominated or elected and the local committees have nothing to do with
the constitution of the Board.
It will be seen that the criterion of organisation is functional
throughout rather than local. Under the legislation now in force, the
unity of the wages policy in any given industry is guaranteed through-
out the country. Care has also been taken by the Wages Councils
Act, 1945, and the Catering Wages Act, 1943, that there should be
a measure of co-ordination as between the policies applied in various
industries or branches of an industry. Under the Catering Wages Act
this co-ordination is provided by the permanent Catering Wages Com-
mission of which more will be said hereafter." The Wages Councils
Act enables the minister ito set up "central co-ordinating committees
in relation to any two or more wages councils," constituted very much
like the wages councils themselves, but with purely advisory functions.
Their main task is to assist in the proper delimitation of the jurisdic-
tions of the councils and to recommend to these councils the principles
of policy which they are expected to pursue.3'
CREATION AND ABOLITION OF WAGE REGULATING AUTHORITIES
A legal system determined to foster the growth of voluntary bar-
gaining cannot leave to the unfettered discretion of the civil service
the extensive regulative interference with conditions of employment
inherent in the power to establish wages councils and boards. It
is true that, to some extent, their composition safeguards the interests
of the voluntary organisations, but the mere existence of a board may
and does affect the life of an industry. It may either stimulate or
weaken the willingness of employers and workers to join an organisa-
tion. The new legislation has therefore set up a new mechanism for
the creation of wages councils and catering wages boards, a mecha-
nism operated partly by the civil service, partly by the voluntary or-
ganisations, and partly by independent mixed commissions.
79. Id. § 2(4).
80. Catering Wages Act, 1943, §§ 1, 2.
81. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 8. This will contribute to the solution of the
"scope" problem, discussed SELLS, op. cit. mipra note 14, at 209 et seq.
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(1) The initiative for the setting up of catering wages boards
rests with a permanent body known as the Catering Wages Commis-
sion, 2 a name which is a misnomer and an understatement of its func-
tions. The commission is the prime mover in the setting up of cater-
ing wages boards, 3 but it is also a permanent grand inquest into the
"remuneration, conditions of employment, health (and) welfare" of
all those employed in catering undertakings.8 4 More than that: it is
what in modern British parlance could be described as a permanent
statutory "working-party": it investigates and seeks to improve not
only the social relations in the industry, but also its economic function-
ing, i. e., the "means for meeting the requirements of the public, in-
cluding in particular the requirements of visitors from overseas, and
for developing the tourist traffic."8 5  This is a significant new depar-
ture in English law.86 One body deals with social reform and en-
courages commercial development. Parliament has recognised and
proclaimed that the welfare of the employees and the satisfactory or-
ganisation and working of the industry hang together.
The Commission has a permanent salaried chairman and two fur-
ther independent members.87  In addition it has a maximum of
two representative members each on the employers' and on the workers'
side, appointed after consultation with organisations on both sides.
They must be "qualified to represent the view of employers and
workers respectively," but-and this is decisive-they must not be
"directly connected with the hotel and catering trades." 88 The pattern
of the "board" which advises the minister under the Cotton Manufac-
turing Industry Act recurs here in a different context: like this
"board," the Catering Wages Commission is not an organ of collective
bargaining or of wage regulation. It should look at the industry from
outside, not from inside, as part of the economic life of the nation, not
as the battlefield of social conflicts. Hence the employer-employee
relationship as a general phenomenon is reproduced in the Commis-
sion, but not the specific tension that affects the wages and other con-
ditions under discussion. The representation of employers' and em-
ployees' interests in general ensures, so to speak, the dialectical treat-
ment of social questions on a higher level: the representative members
are parties, "thesis" and "antithesis" in their general outlook, but-
ideally-neutral towards the specific problems they have been ap-
pointed to solve.
82. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 1.
83. Id. §4.
84. Id. §§ 2(1) (a) and (c).
85. Id. §2(1) (b).
86. There was a precedent in the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938, § 2(1) (b).
87. Catering Wages Act, 1943, Schedule I.
88. Experts may assist the Commission as assessors without vote.
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No catering wages board can be established or abolished by the
minister without a recommendation by the Commission. On the other
hand, the minister need not act on the recommendation. The initiative
does not rest with him, the ultimate decision does. 9
(2) Under the Wages Councils Act, however, there is nothing to
correspond to the Catering Wages Commission. Hence, the initiative
for creating wages councils, is shared between the minister and the
voluntary organisations. Where the minister desires to fill a gap left
by the absence of voluntary machinery, the organisations on both sides
are less vitally concerned than where the prospective council is to act
as a "prop for tottering negotiation machinery." In the case of
absence as well as in the case of the threatened disappearance of bar-
gaining machinery the minister may take the first step, but in the latter
case this is not envisaged as the normal procedure." As a rule an
application will be made for the creation of a wages council. The
"tottering" joint industrial council, conciliation board, etc., may, if it
is established by representative organisations on both sides, apply.91
So may the organisations themselves-provided they "habitually take
part in the settlement of remuneration and conditions of employment."
But-again we are reminded of the Cotton Act-the employers can-
not wield this instrument for the re-inforcement of collective bargain-
ing against the workers, nor the workers against the employers. They
must join together when they approach the minister--either ad hoc or
in the more permanent form of a conciliation board, etc.-and may
thus secure additional strength against recalcitrant members or out-
siders on both sides.92 Other organisations or joint industrial councils
and similar bodies interested in the matter must be consulted by the
minister.
93
As a further precaution, the Wages Councils Act, following in the
footsteps of the Cotton Act and the Catering Wages Act, has provided
for "commissions of inquiry." These are replicas of the Catering
Wages Commission-their representative members must not be con-
nected with the subject-matter of the investigation-but they are ap-
pointed ad hoc and have no permanent chairman. 4  If the minister
proposes to establish a wages council on the ground that collective bar-
gaining in an industry is likely to fail, he must summon a commission
89. §§4(3), 5(1). This too reproduces the pattern of the Cotton (Temporary)
Act, 1934.
90. Wages Councils Act, 1945, §§ 1(2) (a), 3.
91. Id. §2(1) (a).
92. Id. §2(1) (b).
93. Id. § 2(3).
94. Id. Schedule II.
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of inquiryY He cannot, on this ground, set up wage fixing machinery
without a positive recommendation from the commission though ,he
may refuse to act upon it. If, however, he wants to modify the recom-
mendation in any important respect, he must first refer it back-a
course of action which might meet with difficulties in practice in view
of the transient nature of the commission. 6
A commission of inquiry may, but need not be consulted if the
proposed wages council is designed to fill a gap left by the absence of
voluntary bargaining machinery-in this case the need for additional
safeguards is less urgent-but the procedure is compulsory where
such machinery exists but is threatened with failure, no matter whether
the minister acts proprio motu or on application. 7  In the latter case
the minister has very little discretion. He cannot go into the merits of
the case. An application which establishes a prima facie case compels
him to submit the matter to a commission of inquiry, unless the
organisations fail to establish their locus standi, i. e., to satisfy the
minister that they are of a type qualified to apply.9"
Since the entire machinery of statutory wage regulation is sub-
sidiary to voluntary collective bargaining, joint industrial councils and
similar bodies or representative organisations on both sides acting
jointly may apply to the minister for the abolition of a wages council,
on the ground that they provide voluntary machinery "which is, and
is likely to remain, adequate." Unless the minister accedes to such
a request, he must refer it to a commission of inquiry. Statutory ma-
chinery should not survive the advent of voluntary bargaining. When
the building is under roof, the scaffolding must be pulled down.
99
(3) For many years, it has been the policy of British legislation
to use official institutions in order to stimulate and improve collective
bargaining. This policy can be traced back into the 19th century, and
permeates the modern statutes from the Conciliation Act, 1896, on-
wards.1' Under the new legislation the Catering Wages Commission
and the commissions of inquiry have been enlisted in support of this
policy. If these bodies find that the collective bargaining system they
are scrutinising is not satisfactory, but "can by improvements which it
95. Id. §§ 1(2) (b), 2(2) (a), 3, 4(4).
96. Id. §§4(5), 9(3) and (4) ; cf. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 4(4).
97. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 1.
98. Id. § 2(2). Compare SELLS, op. cit. spra note 14, c. IV, for a description of
the System under the Trade Boards Acts.
99. § 6 (2), as amended by § 4 of the Wages Councils Act, 1948. This happened
recently in the case of the wages council for the furniture trade. The minister may
also, of his own motion, abolish, or vary the jurisdiction of, a wages council. See
§6(1).
100. See note 6 supra.
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is practicable to secure" be made adequate, they will, instead of recom-
mending a wages council or board, suggest such improvements to the
minister who must try to see that they are implemented.'' If he fails
in this, the immense advantage gained by the existence of a permanent
body under the Catering Wages Act becomes apparent: the matter will
simply be referred back to the Commission with the minister's observa-
tions for further report.'0 2 Under the Wages Councils Act the matter
is at an end, unless the minister initiates proceedings de novo, includ-
ing possibly the summoning of a fresh commission of inquiry.
The commissions of inquiry consider not only the subject matter
expressly submitted to them, but "any other question or matter . . .
relevant thereto." They may thus, of their own initiative, recommend
a wages council or the improvement of voluntary machinery for those
whose work is "complementary, subsidiary or closely allied" to that
mentioned in the reference. The benefits of this legislation may thus
be extended to small and scattered groups of workers, "forgotten
men," whose unions are not sufficiently interested in them to set the
Act in motion in their favour. The general jurisdiction of the Cater-
ing Wages Commission covers these matters, but the power vested in
the commissions of inquiry of giving a wide interpretation to their
terms of reference may partly make up for the lack of a permanent
organisation under the Act of 1945.103
(4) At various stages of the proceedings the outside public must
be given an opportunity to be heard. Thus, commissions of inquiry
under the 1945 Act and the Catering Wages Commission must publish
a notice stating the questions under consideration, and must consider
written representations made within a stated period.0 4 Objections by
outsiders can again be raised-under the 1945, not under the 1943
Act-before the minister makes the order the draft of which must be
laid open to public inspection.'0 5 The Order itself is laid before
Parliament for forty days. It can be annulled by a resolution of either
House.' These are, what one may call, the classical safeguards
against administrative transgression. Although they were rather
prominent in the debates in the House of Commons which preceded
the passing of the 1945 Act, one may surmise that the new system of
101. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 3(1); Wages Councils Act, 1945, §§ 4(2) and
(3).
102. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 3 (2).
103. Wages Councils Act, 1945, §4(1).
104. Catering Wages Act, 1943, §4(2); Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 8(2).
105. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 5.
106. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 16; Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 21 and (as to
publication) § 5(5).
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"collective" safeguards will, in the operation of this legislation, prove
a more powerful and effective method of bringing public opinion to
bear on the administration of these statutes. The Catering Wages
Commission submit to the minister an annual report of their proceed-
ings which is also laid before Parliament.
1 7
JURISDICTION
For the jurisdiction and functions of wage regulating authorities,
no less than for their composition, a fairly uniform pattern has been
evolved in the course of the last forty years, but recent statutes have
made these bodies more flexible and have removed a great deal of
the casuistry with which their action used to be encumbered.
(1) The jurisdiction of a wages council, unlike that of one of the
defunct trade boards, refers to "specified workers" and no longer, as
has been mentioned, to a "specified trade." Thus orders may be made
regulating the remuneration of workers scattered over various in-
dustries.' °8 The criterion of delimitation may be the type of work,
the type of employer, or the locality. The same is true under the
Catering Wages Act, except that the order must refer to persons em-
ployed in an undertaking or part of an undertaking which carries on
the business of catering. 09 The Agricultural Wages Board can only
make orders affecting workers in agriculture (a term whose definition
was recently very much extended) in a given county," 0 but it may sub-
divide the workers subject to its jurisdiction into as many categories
as it thinks fit, ratione loci or ratione materiae or both."' Even this
centralised machinery can hardly be accused of not being adaptable to
varying local and industrial conditions.
(2) None of the statutory authorities dealt with in this paper has
ever been used for the realisation of "fair labour standards" generally.
Working hours, for example, are outside their jurisdiction. Where
107. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 2(1) (d).
108. Compare Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 1(1), with Trade Boards Act, 1909,
§ 1, and with Trade Boards Act, 1918, § 1. Within a "trade" the Trade Boards were
empowered to fix minimum rates for special processes, areas, and classes of workers,
Trade Boards Act, 1909, § 4(1). There is now no need to go into the difficulties con-
nected with the definition of a "trade." See the conflicting opinions in R. v. Minister
of Labour, [1932] 1 K. B. 1, and in Skinner v. Breach, [1927] 2 K. B. 221. There is
now no reason why wages councils should be unable to fix differential remuneration
for the workers of a named employer, which is what Humphreys, J., in R. v. National
Arbitration Tribunal, [1942] 2 All Eng. 162, 168 (K. B.), said trade boards were not
in a position to do.
109. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 1 (1).
110. Agriculture Wages Act, 1948, § 17(1).
111. Id. at Schedule IV.
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it was intended to establish working hours maxima, this was done by
direct legislation," 2 but in the vast majority of cases the working
hours of adult males are regulated by collective agreements. Cater-
ing wages boards may fix "intervals for meals or rest," 113 and all
wage regulating authorities can indirectly exercise a strong influence
on the "normal working day" by fixing overtime rates and laying
down the conditions under which they are earned." 4  Otherwise they
are encouraged to investigate, report on and make recommendations
for the improvement of working conditions, health and welfare in gen-
eral, without, however, being able to lay down or to propose any
binding rules in these respects. Wages councils must report on such
matters upon the request of a government department, and a catering
wages board may report to the Commission which transmits such
recommendations to the department concerned after having consulted
other wages boards and such joint industrial councils as have been ap-
proved as "adequate" by the Commission itself." 5
The agricultural wages committees have recently been enabled
to secure that learners in agriculture receive adequate instruction and
that the terms of their employment are in other respects satisfactory.
The sanction of this norm is provided by a rule that the committee
may withdraw the employer's privilege to pay the (lower) minimum
rate for learners if he fails to comply with the conditions imposed by
the committee: the power of fixing differential wage rates thus becomes
the instrument for the regulation of conditions of employment and
training in general. 116
(3) The proper province of the councils' and boards' activities
is the regulation of remuneration, of holidays, and of holiday re-
muneration. It is here that radical changes were made in the law in
the last few years.
The most important of these changes was the transition from the
fixing of wage rates to that of "remuneration." Under the Trade
Boards Acts the statutory bodies were able only to fix time rates of
112. E. g., for women and young persons, by the Factories Act, 1937, 1 GEo. VI,
c. 67; Shops Act, 1934, 24 & 25 GEo. V, c. 42; and Coal Mines Act, 1911, 162 GEo.
V, c. 50; and, for adult males, by the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908, 8 EDw. VI,
c. 57 (as amended).
113. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 8(1) (b).
114. The power to fix overtime rates and the conditions under which they are
earned was conferred upon the trade boards by the Act of 1918, § 3(1), and is now
inherent in the power of the wages councils and catering wages boards to fix remunera-
tion. For the corresponding power of the Agricultural Wages Board see Agricul-
tural Wages Act, 1948, § 3 (4). Compare SELLS, op. cit supra note 14, at 290 et seq.
115. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 7(2) ; Catering Wages Act, §§ 6(3), (4), (5).
116. Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 6. See for the control of apprenticeship
by trade boards, SELLS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 190-195.
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various kinds (including over-time rates) and piece rates. In other
words they could merely say: during such and such a time unit
(usually an hour) of work actually done, or for so many pieces of
work actually performed this category of workers must at least earn
so much." 7  They had no power to lay down the conditions under
which the employer or the worker bore the risk of impossibility of
performance (e. g., on the ground of illness, lack of fuel, lack of raw
materials, weather conditions etc.), no power to vouchsafe to the
worker a guaranteed minimum of remuneration for any given period
(e. g., a week) irrespective of the quantity of work done, no power to
compel employers to remunerate workers for their preparedness to do
work frustrated by events for which the workers were not respohnsible,
except in cases in which workers were on the employers' premises
waiting for work."' The Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act,
1924, was based on the same rigid system of wage-rate regulation." 9
The first statute to replace it by a power to fix "remuneration" was
the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938,120 but it was the development of
British labour law during the Second World War which inaugurated
a general change. The Essential Work Orders 121 under which the
labour market was organised during the War tied the worker to the
job, but protected him, on the other hand, against dismissal. Under
these Orders he enjoyed the benefit of the "guaranteed week," i. e., of
a guaranteed weekly remuneration payable by the employer irrespec-
tive of the work performed or the worker's preparedness to do it.
The Catering Wages Act, 1943, and the Wages Councils Act, 1945,
empower the boards and councils to fix "the remuneration to be paid
either generally or for any particular work," 122 and a similar power
has now, by the Act of 1948, been conferred on the Agricultural
Wages Board.'23 The principle of the "guaranteed week,"-which is
rapidly gaining ground in voluntary collective agreements, can thus
be given statutory force, despite the fact that the wartime system of
tying to the job has now disappeared. The common lawyers, inter-
ested in the problems of frustration and impossibility of performance
and in the general question of the distribution of contractual risks,
should perhaps pay closer attention to these new developments than
they seem to have done so far.
117. Trade Boards Act, 1909, §4; Trade Boards Act, 1918, §3.
118. Trade Boards Act, 1918, § 8. The economic importance of these matters is
analysed by SELLs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 228 and 327.
119. Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act, 1924, 14 & 15 GEo. V, c. 37, § 2.
120. Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938, § 2(1) (e) (now repealed).
121. See S. R. & 0., 1942, No. 1594.
122. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 8 (1) (a) ; Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 10 (1) (a).
123. Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 3(3), re-enacting § 1 (3) of the Agricul-
tural Wages (Regulation) Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c. 15.
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A number of ancillary problems arise from the regulation of
wages, problems which loom very large in the practice of the statutory
bodies, but can only be slightly touched upon in this paper. Elaborate
provisions have been enacted with a view to enabling wages councils,
catering wages board and agricultural wages committees to grant ex-
emption permits to workers incapable of earning the statutory re-
muneration owing to infirmity or physical incapacity, and to fix mini-
mum wages for such workers-provisions designed to remove from
the statutory machinery the reproach of inflexibility which is some-
times levelled against it.
2 4
The problem of permissible deductions is of great complexity
and bound up with the intricate British Anti-Truck legislation, with
income tax and social insurance, with voluntary superannuation and
thrift schemes, and, above all, with the vital question of the valuation
to be placed on "benefits and advantages" granted to the worker by
the employer. The importance attached to these matters emerges from
the debates in the House of Commons preceding the passing of the
Wages Council Act: the relevant clause of the Bill was subject to more
far reaching amendments in Committee than any other part of the
measure, and, as it now stands, the Wages Councils Act provides a
much more detailed code governing "authorised deductions" than any
of the other relevant statutes.125 It is, however, in agriculture that
this topic is especially important: the definition of benefits and ad-
vantages deductible from the cash wages of agricultural workers and
their valuation has always been one of the principal functions of
agricultural wages committees under statutory powers which have
now been transferred to the Board. 20  The committees have, however,
retained what is, in practice, perhaps the most significant part of their
activities in this respect, the right to define the value of a tied agricul-
tural labourer's cottage and thus the amount of rent the landlord or
farmer may deduct from the minimum wage.12 7  Employers subject to
the Wages Councils Act and to the Agricultural Wages Act may not-
as a rule-receive premiums from or on behalf or account of ap-
prentices or learners, except with the approval of the relevant statutory
body, and contravention of this prohibition gives rise not only to a
124. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 12; Catering Wages Act, 1943, §§ 9(4) (5)
Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 5. See SELLS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 183-186.
125. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 13 which should be compared with Clause 13
of the Government Bill. The effect of the amendment was, inter alla, to enable the
employers to make a number of deductions, e. g., for fines, damages, the supply of
materials and tools, etc., provided a number of precautions as to form of contract,
etc., are complied with. See also Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 10.
126. Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 7.
127. Id. § 7(3).
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a
criminal prosecution but also to a statutory quasi-contractual civil ac-
tion for recovery. 
12
(4) The movement for "holidays with pay" made rapid headway
after the First World War. It is now the universal practice for col-
lective agreements to make provision for paid vacations.1 29  The Holi-
days with Pay Act, 1938, enables the Minister of Labour to "approve"
such voluntary schemes, to second officers of the Ministry to assist
in their administration and to grant financial help by way of loans. 30
The holidays with pay movement could not fail to lead to an extension
of the jurisdiction of the statutory wage regulating authorities. The
Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938, gave the Central Board the power
to fix "holiday remuneration," 181 i. e., the amount payable in the event
of holidays being granted, but it was the Holidays with Pay Act, 1938
which conferred on all statutory authorities the power to fix a mini-
mum duration for paid holidays and the remuneration payable for
them.'3 2  This power-now exercised by wages councils, catering
wages boards and the Agricultural Wages Board under their respec-
tive statutes '33---can only be exercised for the benefit of those workers
whose general remuneration has been fixed: statutory holidays are,
so to speak, always "appurtenant" to general minimum remuneration,
they cannot be granted "in gross." 134 Their duration must always be
proportionate to the period of employment with the particular em-
ployer.'38 The details of the regulations are of great interest both
from a social and from a legal point of view. The provisions as to
accrual and apportionment might have yielded a rich crop of legal
intellectual exercises for which, however, fortunately, they failed to
give opportunities in practice.
(5) The task of making the necessary investigations is entrusted
to the councils and boards. They must give the public an opportunity
128. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 14; Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, §§ 6(5),
(6), (7).
129. See for detailed information: HOLIDAYS WITH PAY. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN ORGANISATIONS OF EMPLOYERS AND WORKPEOPLE (min. Lab. 1939). See
also INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS HANDBOOK, Supp. No. 1, 22, 39 (1947). In May, 1947,
there were in existence over 1100 collective agreements providing for holidays with
pay. Altogether between 11 and 12 million wage-earners are entitled to paid holidays,
either under collective agreements or under statutory orders.
130. Holidays with Pay Act, 1938, 1 & 2 GEO. VI, c. 70, § 4.
131. 1 & 2 GEo. VI, c. 44, 82(1) (a) (now repealed).
132. 1 & 2 GRo. VI, c. 70, 8 1.
133. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 10; Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 8; Agricultural
Wages Act, 1948, § 3. Before 1947 all but three of the then existing 51 wages coun-
cils had exercised this power and fixed holidays. Catering wages boards have fixed
holidays for workers in canteens and restaurants. See INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS HAND-
BOOK, Supp. I, 37 et seq. (1947).
134. Terms borrowed from real property law where they are used in the law of
easements.
135. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 10(2) ; Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 8(2);
Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 3(3) ; Holidays with Pay Act, 1938, § 1 (1), 1 (2).
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of inspecting the draft of any regulation they wish to make, and con-
sider written objections raised or representations made within a pre-
scribed period.'31 Thus far the procedural principles applicable to all
these bodies are fairly uniform. It is when we come to the legal effect
of the action decided upon by the councils and boards that we see a
difference between the Agricultural Wages Board on one side and the
councils and boards established under the Wages Councils and Cater-
ing Wages Acts on the other. The Agricultural Wages Board does
not only fix the standards it wishes to impose but makes the statutory
orders by which they take legal effect: the minister is out of the picture
altogether. The wages councils and catering wages boards, however,
merely submit a "proposal" to the minister of Labour, and it is for
the minister to decide whether or not these proposals are to be given
the force of law by a "wage regulation order." While it is therefore
the minister, and the minister only who, from a legal point of view,
wields in these cases the power of delegated legislation and of imposing
"statutory minimum remuneration," it is possible to exaggerate the
practical importance of the difference between the system covering
agriculture and that adopted in the other statutes. Under these stat-
utes the minister cannot vary the regulations submitted to him by a
council or board. All he has is a "veto" with the result that, in the
last resort, he can paralyse the action of the indelpendent bodies with-
out being able to direct it. He must take the proposal submitted to
him or leave it. In the latter case he may refer it back to the council
or board with his observations and the council or board may (or may
not) give effect to them in the form of amendments. Theoretically
these proceedings may result in a deadlock; in practice this has not, in
recent times, happened in fact. It remains true, however,-and this
no doubt is the rationale of ihese provisions-that this distribution of
functions between the independent boards and the civil service gives
to the latter an opportunity for influencing and thus for co-ordinating
the action of the various bodies. The Ministry of Labour is thus
enabled to give effect-in certain limits-to a wages policy, a power
withheld from the Ministry of Agriculture.
13 7
(6) The jurisdiction of the various wage regulating authorities
may easily overlap. Under the Wages Regulation and Catering
Wages Acts this can be prevented by a cautious formulation of the
Orders setting up the councils and boards and through the action of
136. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 10(3) ; Wages Councils Act, 1948, §6(2)
Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 8(3) ; Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, Schedule IV.
137. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 10(7) ; Catering Wages Act, 1943. § 8(4);
Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 3. See SELLS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 137, 205-209.
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the Catering Wages Commission and of the central co-ordinating
committees. Any difficulties that may arise in practice are removed
by provisions which deprive the catering wages boards of any power
to affect any worker in relation to employment subject to the juris-
diction of another wage regulating authority. 38 If nevertheless clashes
should occur, the problem would be solved by a general principle that
the ruling most favourable to the worker prevails. 39
ENFORCEMENT
What are the legal sanctions by which the statutory standards
are enforced? In this respect more than half a century's experience of
social legislation was brought to bear on the drafting of the Trade
Boards Act, 1909, and a tri-partite scheme of sanctions, penal, civil,
and administrative, was evolved which has stood the test of time and
has not been essentially affected by recent developments.
(1) An employer who fails to pay the statutory remuneration
or holiday remuneration or to allow the worker the statutory holidays
(or, under the Catering Wages Act, intervals for meal or rest), is
liable on summary conviction to a fine up to £20 for each offence, and,
in agriculture, to a further fine up to £1 for each day on which the
offence is continued after conviction.M4 ° An agent of the employer who
is guilty of the offence is similarly liable (e. g., a foreman) and the
employer can exculpate himself by showing that the agent was exclu-
sively responsible and that he himself had used all due diligence.' 4'
The burden of proving compliance with the statutes rests on the
employer.1
42
(2) The penal sanction by itself is a notoriously ineffective way
of enforcing social legislation. Only by limiting the freedom of con-
tract of employer and employee can the observance of any minimum
138. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 8(7).
139. Expressed in Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 10(7) ; Catering Wages Act, 1943,
§ 8(7). It goes without saying that the existence of an Order does not deprive a
worker of any rights he may have under an agreement or custom. § 11(2) of the
Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, which formulates this expressis verbis, was hardly
necessary. All orders are minimum regulations.
140. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 11(2); Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 9(2);
Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 4. For a description of the practical operation of the
sanctions under the Trade Boards Acts, see SELLS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 212-240.
141. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 16; Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 12; Agricul-
tural Wages Act, 1948, § 10.
142. This is expressly laid down in Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, §4(3), but
would seem to be of general application. The leading case on the principle that the
accused must disprove, negative facts "peculiarly within his knowledge" is Rex -r.
Turner, 5 M. and S. 206, 105 Eng. Rep. 1026 (K. B. 1816).
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standards be effectively secured. A contract of employment which is
subject to a wages regulation or similar order takes effect as if the
statutory remuneration, holidays, and holiday remuneration were sub-
stituted for any corresponding terms of the contract less favourable
to the worker. 4 ' A "back-pay" order up to two years can be made
by a court of summary jurisdiction in the course of the criminal pro-
ceedings, or the worker can pursue his remedy in the civil court.'44
Such civil proceedings may, on the worker's behalf and in his name,
be instituted by the enforcement officer.
145
(3) Experience has shown-the history of English Factory
Legislation supplies the classical example 146-- that without the exist-
ence of administrative machinery statutory standards can scarcely be
enforced in practice. It is impossible, without a system of factory
inspection, to translate into practice the law relating to health, safety,
and welfare, and to the working hours of women and young persons.
It is equally futile to try to impose minimum conditions as to wages,
holidays and holiday remuneration without a permanent adminis-
trative machinery. Enforcement officers are therefore appointed under
all these statutes ' endowed with far-reaching powers of inspecting
and copying wage sheets, receipts and other relevant documents, ex-
amining workers as well as employers and their agents, entering prem-
ises, prosecuting offenders etc. Employers---except in agriculture-
must keep records and see that, through posters and otherwise, their
workers are informed of their rights.' 48  Non-compliance with these
provisions, or with the legitimate requirements made by an enforce-
ment officer is a criminal offense. 149  It is also a criminal offence to
obstruct an officer in the exercise of his powers or to produce falsified
143. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 11(1); Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 9(1);
Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 11(1). The legal nature of compulsory implied
terms in a contract has been repeatedly discussed by the Courts in a variety of con-
texts. See Bromford v. South Worcestershire Assessment Committees, [1946] 2 All
Eng. 80 (K. B.) ; Gutsell v. Reeves, [1936] 1 K. B. 372; Powers v. Bawyer, [1945]
1 All Eng. 664 (C. A.).
144. Wages Councils Act, § 11(2), (3), (4) ; Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 9(3)
Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 4. The limitation period for back pay orders in civil
proceedings is that applicable to contractual, not that governing statutory claims. This
was decided by the Court of Appeals in Gutsell v. Reeves, supra note 143.
145. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 17(5) ; Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 13(4);
Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, §§ 4, 12.
146. HUTCHINS & HARuusox, A HISTORY OF FACTORY LEGISLATION 36 et seq.
(1911). The remark in the text refers to the Factory Act, 1833, which is the begin-
ning of the development.
147. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 17; Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 13; Agricul-
tural Wages Act, 1948, § 12.
148. Wages Councils Act, 1945, 8815(1), 15(2); Catering Wages Act, 1943,
§§11(1), 11(2).
149. Wages Councils Act, 1945, 8815(3), 17(6) ; Catering Wages Act, 1943,
§811(3), 13 (6).
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records or wrong information. 5 ° The fairly uniform system of ad-
ministrative powers and corresponding duties evolved under these
statutes is subject to a number of variations, some of which are of
more than technical interest. Thus, the existence of the permanent
Catering Wages Commission has made it possible to utilise the en-
forcement machinery for the purposes for which the commission was
estabilshed.' 5 ' Moreover the policy of keeping the catering business
under effective supervision has led to the further step-not taken else-
where--of enabling the minister to impose on selected categories of
employers the duty to register their businesses. 52
GENERAL POLICY
A study of the recent transformations of the law would be incom-
plete without a reference to the important new provision that individual
employers are under an obligation to observe recognised terms and
conditions, which-following a war-time order '53 -has also been in-
corporated in the Wages Councils Act.'54 This is not the place to
discuss the great changes in the law of collective bargaining inherent
in the adoption of this new principle. Suffice it to say that the pattern
of law enforcement gradually developed since the First World War
in connection with the fair wages clauses has now-at least tem-
porarily-been extended to collective agreements in general: those
agreements which, on both sides, are concluded by representative or-
ganisations, give rise to a legal obligation to observe their terms. 55
They are not, however, directly enforceable in the courts. If a question
arises as to whether any such "recognised terms and conditions" apply
to a given contract of employment or whether they have in fact been
observed by the employer, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court can
be invoked."' That Court, acting, in fact, as a law-making body, then
lays down the law of the trade by an award, the terms of which are
legally enforceable and become-in certain circumstances retrospec-
tively-compulsory terms of the contracts of employment to which
they refer. But they are not by any means necessarily identical with
those of the collective agreement whose alleged violation occasioned
150. Wages Councils Act, 1945, §§ 17(6), 18; Catering Wages Act, 1943, §§ 13 (6),
14; Agricultural Wages Act, 1948, § 12(7).
151. Catering Wages Act, 1943, § 13 (5).
152. Id. § 7.
153. Part III (Art. 5) of the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitra-
tion Order, S. R. & 0., 1940, No. 1305.
154. Wages Councils Act, 1945, § 19 and Schedule III.
155. Id. at Schedule III, No. 1.
156. Id. at Schedule III, No. 2.
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the proceedings. 15 7  This new pattern of collective labour law does
not form the subject-matter of this article and has been discussed else-
where. It has, in the legal sense, nothing to do with minimum wage
legislation, yet, in their operation, collective bargaining and minimum
wage law are here, as everywhere, complementary institutions.
In fact, two streams of legislation have merged into one in the
Wages Councils Act. The idea of collective bargaining dominates
both the organisation of the wage fixing bodies and the definition of
their functions-more so to-day than ever before. The extension of
these functions so as to include the support of existing bargaining ma-
chinery is only one further step, and a natural step, in a development
which was set in motion by the Trade Boards Act of 1909. At the
same time, however, this method of strengthening the combined
autonomous action of the two sides of industry has been supplemented
by a novel-if perhaps temporary-method of procedure and indirect
sanction, novel in its generality rather than in its conception. The
law of recognised terms and conditions belongs to a legislative tradi-
tion which began shortly after the First World War, and the traces
of which are scattered over the Statute Book in laws totally uncon-
nected with minimum wage legislation. Now, however, the law seems
to have reached a stage of greater maturity and systematic cohesion.
Where collective bargaining is in danger of foundering because its
institutions are not sufficiently strong or the standard of conformity
with its terms is inadequate, the wages councils machinery will be set
in motion. Where trouble arises because the terms of the agreements
or the scope of their application is ambiguous or because, in isolated
cases, they failed to secure observance, the law of recognised terms and
conditions will come to the rescue. It will, so to speak, provide a
remedy for the less serious or permanent, but, none the less trouble-
some, cases of disorder, while minimum wage law will remain in the
background should the situation call for a stronger medicine.
When, in March 1945, Parliament passed the Wages Councils
Act, many observers anticipated that there would be a wave of un-
employment not long after the end of hostilities. The analogy of the
post-1918 situation misled many economists and politicians in this
country no less than in the United States. Hard industrial struggles
following in the wake of a deflationary crisis were forecast, and it was
157. Id. at Schedule III, No. 3. These proceedings are inapplicable to workers
subject to minimum wage laws. § 19(1) Proviso. "Recognized terms and conditions"
and statutory minimum remuneration are mutually exclusive. Cf. R. v. National Arbi-
tration Tribunal, [1943] 2 All Eng. 162 (K. B.), where a divisional court decided
that the functions of a trade board and compulsory arbitration were so different that
the existence of the former could not exclude the arbitration jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Arbitration Tribunal.
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feared that after the war many of the voluntary joint industrial coun-
cils which had come into being between 1940 and 1945 would disperse
like many of their predecessors after 1918.158 It was to meet this
anticipated situation-the concomitant of deflation and unemploy-
ment-that the Wages Councils Act was passed. The facts have so
far belied these expectations. We are suffering from shortage of
labour, not from unemployment, and, in a labour market in which
frequently the demand exceeds the supply, minimum standards of
labour conditions were not as much in need of legal protection as they
were expected to be when the Act was passed. Nevertheless, the ap-
plication of minimum wage legislation has been greatly extended under
the Act. By a series of Orders the bulk of the retail distribution
trade-more than a million workers-have, since the War, been
brought within its scope. 59 Irrespective of future economic develop-
ments, wages councils and similar statutory bodies are clearly destined
to occupy an increasingly important place in British social and eco-
nomic life.
158. See Mr. Bevin's speech in the House of Commons, 407 H. C. DEB. 78 (5th
ser. 1944-45).
159. See, e. g., Wages Council (Retail Food Trades, England and Wales) Order,
S. R. & 0., 1947, No. 1791; Wages Council (Retail Newsagency, Tobacco and Con-
fectionery Trade, England and Wales) Order, S. R. & 0., 1947, No. 1792; Wages
Council (Retail Newsagency, Tobacco and Confectionery Trades, Scotland) Order,
S. R. & 0., 1947, No. 2313; Wages Council (Retail Bookselling and Stationery
Trades, Great Britain) Order, S. R. & 0., 1947, No. 2312.
